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This dissertation examines whether the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program improves
long-term labor force participation of its recipients.
The first chapter studies the mechanisms which can generate prolonged effects of wage sub-
sidies on employment, wages, job stability and poverty. I model three mechanisms: experience
accumulation, heterogeneity in the job offer arrival rates, and the costs of switching in and out of
employment. I estimate the dynamic discrete-choice model of employment and program participation
using a sample of single women from Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The estimates suggest
that the EITC program primarily stimulates part-time employment. EITC recipients do not become
self-sufficient over the long-term because part-time experience accumulation does not translate into
substantial wage growth. The interaction between EITC and other public assistance programs also
makes part-time jobs desirable. Counterfactual experiments reveal that in order to promote human
capital accumulation and wage growth, the number of hours worked should become one of the
determinants in the EITC payment schedule.
The second chapter estimates the life-long effects of the EITC program on employment decisions
of single women. To identify those effects I choose a natural experiment framework and use the
discontinuity in the eligibility criteria (and payments) associated with the age of the youngest child
in the household. I estimate a model with a conditional (fixed-effect) logistic regression using a
sample of single women from Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The estimates suggest that there is
no significant life-long effect of the EITC program on female labor force participation. The result is
robust to the definition of the control group and the length of the estimated long-term effects. This
conclusion supports the concerns that low-skilled workers do not accumulate experience required for
a better employment opportunities. That being said, EITC should be considered solely as a short-term
subsidy rather than a long-term investment into experience accumulation.
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Chapter 1
Long-term Consequences of the EITC
Program
1.1 Introduction
The recent trends in federal budget deficits and increased inequality sparked a new wave of interest
in tax reform and poverty reduction programs. The issue of ”dependency versus self-sufficiency” is
central to these discussions. In particular, is it possible to move people out of poverty by stimulating
employment, promoting wage growth and employment stability among low-skilled workers?
In light of these questions the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) becomes relevant. The EITC is
a refundable tax credit for low- and medium-income individuals and couples, primarily for those
who have qualifying children. This is one of the major programs designed to reduce poverty and
provide work incentives in the US. Estimates suggest that EITC lifts about 5 million households
out of the poverty each year. In 2009, 27 million of the EITC returns generated a total payment to
recipients of about $60 billion.1
Given the size and importance of the EITC program, it is not surprising that the labor economics
literature has focused on its effect on labor force participation (Dickert et al., 1995; Grogger, 2003;
Hotz et al., 2005; Eissa and Hoynes, 2006). Even though the magnitude of the estimated effect varies,
1More than 70% of EITC recipients are single, both in terms of the number of returns and total amount paid; 60% of
single women with children receive EITC.
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empirical studies generally find that EITC stimulates employment among single women. For instance,
Eissa and Liebman (1996) examine 1986 EITC expansion impact and estimate a 2.4-4.1 percentage
point increase in labor force participation (LFP) for single mothers. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001)
estimate an increase in LFP by 7-10 percentage points between 1990 and 1996.
According to the human capital theory, however, increased employment should transfer into wage
growth through experience accumulation. Wage growth in turn, could translate into self-sufficiency,
a desirable feature of any poverty reduction program. In fact, this argument was used to justify
the ”quick labor force attachment” approach - women who take low-paying and part-time jobs will
eventually move up to the higher-paying and full-time jobs (Pavetti and Acs, 2001). This motivation
was part of the welfare reform in mid 1990’s2 and it has still a part of the 2012 election campaign
for both parties.3 In fact, Dahl et al. (2009) claim that work encouraged through the EITC program
continues to pay off through future increases in earnings.4
Other empirical work has been less certain about the possibility of experience accumulation
and its transformation into the wage growth for low-skilled workers. For example, Looney and
Manoli (2011) find no effect of additional years of experience on the earnings, wages, or employment
opportunities of single mothers in 1990s. This result calls in question whether EITC has positive
long-term effects on financial independence.
However, the literature also highlights other channels for prolonged effects of EITC. Blau and
Robins (1990) suggest that the job offer arrival rates for employed individuals are higher than for the
unemployed. Cogan (1981) proposes the idea of fixed costs of entry into the labor market: the exit
from nonemployment to employment is associated with additional adjustment costs. This channel
might be especially important for single women with children since their move to employment may
require the search for child care arrangements. This paper estimates the long-term consequences
of the EITC and evaluates the roles of the above channels. In contrast to the majority of earlier
2New York Times, June 25, 1988 discusses a new welfare initiative ”... these [welfare reform] expenditures can
legitimately be seen as an investment to reclaim people from dependency - something that can’t be said about the present
welfare system”. ”Welfare-to-work” is one of the key initiatives in government assistance reforms in the 1990s.
3Paul Ryan: ”The question before us today – and it demands a serious answer – is how do we get the engines of upward
mobility turned back on so that no one is left out.” - speech at Cleveland State University on October 24, 2012.
4Unfortunately, the estimation strategy chosen in this paper has a number of limitations: (1) it assumes the constant
sample composition; (2) it mixes short-term and long-term effects of the program; and finally, (3) it mixes the potential
wage growth with the potential growth in the number of hours worked.
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studies, I model part-time and full-time work as well as program participation decisions using a
dynamic discrete-choice framework which makes it possible to incorporate important elements into
the model: the intertemporal trade-off between current disutility of work and future experience
accumulation, and current and future labor market frictions. These features allow for long-term labor
market effects of the EITC program that may arise due to wage growth or increased employment
opportunities. Program participation decisions make it possible to analyze the program interaction
between other forms of public assistance and the EITC. By incorporating these elements into an
intertemporal model, this paper estimates the importance of different channels through which EITC
affects women’s labor market outcomes over the short and long-term.
The structural parameters of the model are estimated by efficient method of moments using data
for 1994-2001 from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The sample consists of women, heads of
the households, age 21-40 excluding students and disabled.
The estimates are in line with the previous literature and suggest that the EITC program stim-
ulates employment among single women. However, it encourages part-time rather than full-time
employment. Moreover, some women switch from full-time to part-time work because the sum of
EITC and other public assistance payments available with part-time employment offsets the full-time
earnings.
Supporters of the ”Work first” (Brown, 1997) strategy adopted by a number of states to move
people to employment would argue that any employment generates experience, and ultimately, wage
growth. Instead, this paper finds very low returns to part-time experience. This is consistent with
the findings of Corcoran et al. (1983) who argue that part-time work experience does not lead to
significant wage growth and Hirsch (2004) who explains wage differentials between part-time and
full-time employed women through limited work experience and human capital accumulation by
part-time workers.
To estimate the duration of the long-term impact of receiving the EITC, I simulate two scenarios
from the model: first, EITC is not available at all, and second, the EITC program exists for five years
and is then unexpectedly removed. Simulations show that the impact past receipt of EITC vanishes
in 2-3 years following program participation. This result is driven by the higher arrival rates of job
3
offers for employed workers.
The estimated structural parameters are also used to analyze three counterfactual policy experi-
ments: (1) elimination of other forms of public assistance for part-time and full-time workers; (2) an
increase in the EITC payments; and (3) separate EITC payment schedules for part-time and full-time
workers.
The first experiment is motivated by the observed program interaction and focuses on reducing
the appeal of a part-time job in favor of a full-time job. The results emphasize the importance of
EITC in the absence of the other programs and predict higher full-time employment in the long-run
than in the baseline case. The second experiment is designed to make employment more attractive:
the EITC payments are doubled. In this case those who do not work in the baseline move to part-time
employment, due to large public assistance available for part-time workers. The first two experiments
show that full-time jobs cannot become attractive without changes in the proportion of overall public
assistance coming from the EITC. Thus, in the third experiment separate payment schedules are
introduced for part-time and full-time workers. It is estimated that threefold increase in EITC benefits
for full-time employment will generate 5 percentage point increase in full-time employment in the
long-run keeping current other public assistance unchanged.
Some may find these conclusions controversial since under the rules of the third experiment,
workers with higher earnings (full-time employees) are eligible for the higher EITC benefits than
those who earn less while working part-time. While this may seem to contradict the poverty reduction
property of the EITC program, it can achieve the goal of prolonged employment stimulation. While
welfare and food stamps are designed purely as poverty reduction measures, the earned income tax
credit was originally introduced to promote employment. If part-time employment is found to be
only a temporary solution for single women, and full-time employment creates better ground for
self-sufficiency, then the EITC should also aim to encourage full-time work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 1.2. Section 1.3
describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 discusses estimation method.
Results and counterfactual experiments are presented in Sections 1.5 and 1.6. Section 1.7 offers
some final thoughts.
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1.2 Model
In this section I present a dynamic discrete-choice model of decision making for a single woman
with and without children. In each period a woman makes two decisions: whether to work full-time,
part-time or to stay nonemployed, e = {0, 1, 2}, and whether to participate in the public assistance
programs or not b = {0, 1}. Individuals maximize their life-time utility given time and budget
constraints and taking into account the probabilities of job offers and pregnancies.5 The model is
solved by backward recursion with expected values calculated using Monte Carlo simulations.
1.2.1 Preferences
Agents in the model are forward-looking. In each period, t, an individual of age a chooses the
optimal pair dat = {eat, bat} to maximize her expected life-time utility, Uat
max
dat∈Dat
{
Uat = E
[
A∑
a˜=a
δa˜−auda˜t
]}
where Dat is the decision set for a person of age a at time t which depends on the set of available
job offers and the number of children;6 δ is the discount factor; udat is the woman’s one-period
utility function given that choice dat is made. The utility function udat is determined by individual’s
consumption, cat, leisure time, Lat, participation in the public assistance programs, bat, and the costs
of switching between employment options, eat,(a−1)(t−1). Public assistance enters the utility function
directly to allow for social stigma (Keane and Moffitt, 1998) associated with participation in such
programs.7
The utility function is assumed to be log-linear in consumption and leisure; the other arguments
enter the utility as additive components:
uat = u(ln cat, lnLat, bat, eat,(a−1)(t−1), ε
e,b
at )
5Fertility decisions are considered to be exogenous to the EITC program.
6In the model public assistance is not allowed for women without children.
7This model is built specifically for public assistance which goes through welfare and food stamps programs. Disutility
from using such programs may also come from time-consuming and annoying application process. EITC program is not
associated with participation costs since this tax credit becomes available once the standard tax form is completed.
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where εe,bat is a time-varying individual-specific unobserved utility from each choice in the model.
Unobserved utility is assumed to be i.i.d. with a covariance matrix Σu to be estimated. The full
specification for utility function is presented in the Appendix.
1.2.2 Time and Budget Constraints
Leisure time is defined as a time remaining after completing all job arrangements:
Lat = T − heat ,
where T is the total time available throughout the year; heat is hours spent for part-time or full-time
job at t.
Consumption is defined as a sum of after-tax income and public assistance.8
cit = yit − xit + fit = heitwit − xit + fit.
Here, yit is earned income calculated as a product of wage rate wit and hours worked heit ; xit is a
sum of income tax and payroll tax,9 and fit is the amount of public assistance if available.
1.2.3 Wages and Public Assistance
Individual’s offered wage rate is a function of individual’s full-time experience, X2,t and part-
time experience, X1,t;10 time-invariant education level ed; previous period employment et−1 and
current employment option et. εwet is an i.i.d. normally distributed employment-specific wage
unobservable with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ2w. Intuitively, it is expected that the wage
grows with experience and the education level and is lower for part-time jobs and for those who were
recently unemployed. Two separate equations are used for part-time and full-time wages (e ∈ {1, 2}).
8Since low-income single women are usually financially constrained, savings and borrowings are not allowed in the
model. This assumption simplifies the budget constraint by eliminating inter-temporal substitution.
9Payroll tax (FICA) includes Social Security and Medicare payments.
10For the sake of simplification, I drop the age indices in this subsection.
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lnwet = γ
e
0+γ
e
21X2,t+γ
e
22X
2
2,t+γ
e
11X1,t+γ
e
12X
2
1,t+
2∑
j=1
γeedjI(ed = j)+γ
e
e−1I(et−1 = 0)+ε
we
it .
Low-income households11 with children are eligible for government support. The amount of
public assistance depends on the number of children kt and employment status et; 
f
t is an i.i.d.
normally distributed public assistance unobservable with mean zero and variance σ2f . So ft is given
by: 
ln ft = γ
f
0 + γ
f
k2I(kt = 2) + 
f
t if et = 0,
ln ft = γ
f
e1 + γ
f
k2eI(kt = 2) + γ
f
e2I(et = 2) + 
fe
t if et ∈ {1, 2}.
I assume that fit is a sum of the welfare payments12 and the food stamp value. This simplification
reflects the fact that in the framework of this model these two programs are indistinguishable:
program participation generates extra income, and thus consumption, but also creates negative utility
from social disapproval and the application process.13
1.2.4 Job Dynamics and Fertility
Job search frictions are introduced in the model through the job offer probability being less than
one and varying across women. The previous period employment option is available in the current
period with certainty while the availability of another option is uncertain. The offer arrival rates
follow a logistic distribution and depend on the previous period employment status (E(a−1)(t−1) = 0)
as well as current full-time and part-time experiences (X1,at and X2,at).
λeat =
exp{λe0 + λenwI(e(a−1)(t−1) = 0) +
∑2
j=1 λ
e
Xj
Xj,at}
1 + exp{λe0 + λenwI(e(a−1)(t−1) = 0) +
∑2
j=1 λ
E
Xj
Xj,at}
e ∈ {1, 2}.
The presence of children in the household affects the employment decisions as well as program
participation. The model allows for single women with zero, one and two and more children make
11Low-income households here are defined as households with before-tax earned income lower than doubled poverty
threshold.
12Welfare payments are payments associated with AFDC program before 1996 and TANF program after.
13The model does not allow for other types of non-labor income: investment income, child support (availability rate is
less than 4%), child tax credit (the same for everybody and does not alter employment and program participation decisions),
supplemental security income (women in the sample are not eligible) and unemployment insurance (availability rate is less
than 5%).
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different decisions.14 kat is the number of children in the household where kat ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Fertility
decisions are considered to be exogenous to the EITC program which is supported by the findings of
Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003) and Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009).
The pregnancy rate is also assumed to follow a logistic distribution and to depend on woman’s
age at, education ed and the current number of children in the household kat.
φkat =
exp{φk0 +
∑2
j=1 φ
k
j I(ed = j) + φ
k
3at}
1 + exp{φk0 +
∑2
j=1 φ
k
j I(ed = j) + φ
k
3at}
k ∈ {0, 1}.
A woman knows her future pregnancy probabilities for every age. The pregnancy rates are estimated
outside of the model and logit estimation results are presented in Table 1.6.
1.2.5 Dynamic Optimization Problem
In order to solve dynamic optimization problem it is convenient to represent the lifetime utility
maximization problem in terms of value functions. A value Vat(Sat) today is a function of current
state Sat15 and is determined by the current period decision dat.
Vat(Sat) = max
dat∈Dat
[Vdat(Sat)]
where Vdat(Sat) is a choice-specific expected lifetime value function which can be defined through a
Bellman equation:
Vdat(Sat) =

udat + βE(V(a+1)(t+1)(S(a+1)(t+1)|dat ∈ Dat, Sat)) if a < A,
udat if a = A.
The Vdat(Sat) value of any decision dat is a function of the period utility udat and the discounted
expected value of future decisions given the current period choice dat. Expectations represent
uncertainty about future income shocks, realizations of utility unobservables, job offer probabilities
14This assumption is based on the EITC rules which allow different payments for these three categories of households.
15Two subscripts a and t represent individual’s age and calendar year, respectively. This cumbersome notation is
necessary because identical individuals of age a observed in years t1 and t2 faces different taxes and public assistance
policies as well as different EITC schedule and CPI. These changes in economic environment may affect individual’s
decisions.
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and potential pregnancies. I assume that individuals have naive expectations about future CPI, taxes
and policy changes: in year t future values are calculated keeping the CPI, taxes and policies in all
further years at the level of the current year.
The vector of state variables Sat for a woman is characterized by observable and unobservable
characteristics. Observable state variables are woman’s education level ed, the number of children she
has kat, her previous period employment e(a−1)(t−1), her accumulated full-time X2at and part-time
X1at experience, her age at and current tax year t. Unobserved state variables include realized wage
and welfare shocks as well as unobserved utility arguments.
Sat = {ed, kat, e(a−1)(t−1), X1at, X2at, at, t; εat}.
1.2.6 Solution Method
The dynamic programming problem is solved numerically by backward recursion. In the last
period, expected values of the optimal choice are calculated for each reachable state space SAT and
each potential choice set using Monte Carlo simulation. For each period a < A expected values are
calculated given optimal choices for period a+ 1. Current period optimal choices are made based on
future expected values and current information.16
1.2.7 Identification
Variation in individual outcomes and choices, exclusionary restrictions and parametric assump-
tions help identify the structural parameters of the model. A typical identification problem in job
search models is to separately identify the parameters of the job offer rates, the parameters of the
utility function, and the parameters of the wage equation. Since rejected job offers are usually unob-
served, it is hard to distinguish the case of job rejection from the case of no offer. Moreover, since
only accepted wages are observed, the distinction between a low wage offer and a high preference
for leisure becomes problematic as well.
Several strategies are used to solve this problem. The first one is exclusionary restrictions. For
16Discuss assumptions about expected cpi and taxes.
9
example, offered wage depends on linear and squared full-time and part-time experience while utility
of leisure does not and job offer rates depend on experience only linearly. The second assumption
is that the job destruction rate is zero which allows the identification of the job offer arrival rates:
part-time (full-time) employees have an option to stay in part-time (full-time) employment for the
next period. This assumption means that the utility of leisure can be identified from observing
workers who move from employment to nonemployment: it is known that these workers have a job
offer but choose nonemployment. Given the estimated utility of leisure, one can identify job offer
probabilities by observing transitions from nonemployment to full-time and part-time work, and
transitions between employment types.
The utility of the public assistance programs and the parameters of the public assistance amount
are identified through the variation in the size of the accepted public assistance. While utility
parameters are pinned down by the proportion of individuals who use these programs, parameters of
the public assistance amount are determined by the size of the accepted government help.
1.3 Data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a primary source of data in this paper. This
study started in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of over 18,000 individuals living in
5,000 families in the United States. Information on these individuals and their descendants has been
collected continuously, including data covering employment, income, marriage, childbearing and
education.
To answer the questions posed above we need data which satisfies several requirements. Firstly,
it should be a survey long enough to estimate long-term effects. SIPP, a natural choice for estimating
effects of different programs, is not an ideal survey here because a wave length is not long enough.
Second, it should contain information about employment choices, wages and a job history. Third,
program participation data should be available. Finally, EITC and other tax information is necessary
to estimate the model. PSID allows for retrieving demographics, the job history and program
participation data. EITC and tax information is calculated through TAXSIM application provided by
NBER (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993).
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A potential problem with PSID data is the biannual nature of the data collection in recent years
(starting from 1997). Together with the definition of the experience variable in PSID this often leads
to considerable limitations in using PSID in dynamic discrete-choice model estimation.Unfortunately,
this issue limits the time range suitable for this study to 8-year window: the model is estimated using
years 1994 to 2001.17
The sample is restricted to single women with or without children who are between the ages of
21 and 40.18 The model is estimated on core sample data only. Observations with missing welfare
information are excluded.19 In addition, any individual who reports disability or school participation
is excluded. The final panel consists of 1308 individuals with 4335 person-year observations.
1.3.1 Experience, Employment and Earned Income
PSID is not designed to provide detailed information about job transitions and employment history.
This creates a potential problem with using the survey for dynamic discrete-choice estimation with
experience being a state variable. For example, the experience variable in PSID is recorded for the
head of the household only in years when person becomes a head of the household. Thus, experience
needs to be recovered for years when an individual continues to be the head of the household. I
calculate individual’s experience using reported annual hours worked and reported earned income.20
Employment is expected to generate income, so only those who report earned income are
considered to be employed. The threshold between part-time and full-time employment is set at 1500
hours worked per year (based on a definition of full-time job as at least 30 hours for at least 50 weeks
per year). Experience dynamics are recovered from the initially reported full-time and part-time
experience and observed employment dynamics. In the model, full-time employees are assumed to
17Supplementary files on employment choices and program participation are used to recover hours of work and program
participation for 1998 and 2000.
18The choice of age 40 as an upper limit is somewhat restrictive, but it is required for computational tractability. For the
older women the state space should also include the set of children ages since some of the children leaves the household
altering EITC eligibility. Unfortunately, such expansion of the state space is not feasible at this point.
19These restriction excludes a lot of high-income individuals from the sample and lowers the average earnings which
allow focusing on the low-income women. This is a desirable restriction because one could expect that high-income
workers have different decision process from low-income workers, and thus, may distort estimation results.
20This can be done through an individual’s observed employment status. However, employment question asks about an
individual’s current employment status rather than accumulates information about annual work experience.
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work 2000 hours annually, while part-time employees work 870 hours per period.21 Since the model
is written for annual data, the total time available for individual is calculated to be 5840 hours per
year (16 hours of active time a day multiplied by 365 days a year).
Earned income is defined as ”Head’s of the household labor income”. I drop top 5% of the
observations to eliminate outliers and to focus more on the low-income households. Hourly wages
are recovered from reported earned income and annual hours worked.
1.3.2 Other Income Variable: taxes, public assistance, and EITC eligibility
PSID is not connected to IRS tax forms, and thus, does not provide tax information including
EITC participation. Instead, I use EITC eligibility. EITC eligibility requirements are straightforward
and can be used to calculate individual EITC payments. National EITC participation rate estimates
range from 75% to 85% of eligible workers (Plueger, 2009). Moreover, some evidence suggests that
participation rates for groups with larger tax credits is higher: (1) ”IRS research found that in tax year
1996, the average credit claimed by eligible taxpayers was $1,384, while the average credit available
to eligible nonfilers was $1,015” (Berube); (2) participation rates for households with one or two
children is close to 100% (White, 2001). This partly justifies the use of EITC eligibility instead of the
actual EITC participation. Furthermore, it is interesting to estimate the overall effect of the program
given the nonparticipation.
TAXSIM program is used to estimate individual’s income tax, EITC and payroll tax. Since this
application is written to process earned income in nominal terms, all monetary variables remain
nominal. However, in the model individual’s utility function combines consumption with leisure and
other non-monetary components, and thus, requires consumption to have real representation and to
be deflated with the consumer price index (CPI).
I use two major sources of public assistance for single women with children are welfare (ADC
before 1996 and TANF after 1996) and food stamps (SNAP). PSID has detailed monthly reports of
program participation for both. Annual public assistance is calculated as the sum of the food stamps
and the annual welfare payments. It is set to zero for women without children since both programs
21In the data, the median hours worked per year by part-time and full-time workers are 870 and 2000 hours, respectively.
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are designed to support families with children.
1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 provides means for earned income, the amount of public assistance and EITC payments
by employment status. Notice that the sum of public assistance and the EITC payments falls as
employment increases. EITC does not substantially reward full-time employment.
Almost half of part-time workers participate in public assistance and almost 90% of them are
EITC eligible (see Table 1.2). Overall, about 30% of single women in the sample use public assistance
and about 50% of them are eligible for the EITC.
Table 1.3 reports the joint distribution of public assistance participation and EITC eligibility.
One third of women who are eligible for EITC participate in public assistance programs. Moreover,
if the same statistic is calculated by employment type, the data indicates that among those who
work part-time as many as 45.9% are eligible for the EITC and participate in the public assistance
simultaneously. This fact highlights the importance of program interaction for an individual’s
employment decisions.
Finally, table 1.5 provides basic information about EITC eligibility for women with different
education levels and with different family composition. As expected, the EITC program is mostly
important for low-skilled women (over 55% of women with high school degree or below are eligible
for EITC) or women with children (over 65% of women with one child and over 71% of women
with two or more children are eligible for the program).
1.4 Estimation
The estimation of the model presented in Section 1.2 encounters two problems. First, dynamic
discrete-choice models usually cannot be solved analytically and require simulations. Second, the
missing state variables cannot be ignored. In a likelihood-based estimation approach, the solution is
the integration over the distribution of the missing state variables. Since the missing observations
include elements of the state space that take on many values (e.g., two types of experience), this
approach poses a huge computational burden.
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Therefore, the model is estimated using the efficient method of moments (EMM) which is a
generalization for the method of simulated moments (Gourieroux et al., 1993; Gallant and Tauchen,
1996). The moment equations of the EMM estimator are based on the score vector of auxiliary
models. Auxiliary models are estimated on the actual data and are chosen to provide a good statistical
description of the data. The choice of auxiliary models is driven by the structural parameters of the
model and by the set of variables in a state space. Following van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008),
two types of auxiliary models are used in the estimation: first, approximate decision rules that link
endogenous outcomes of the model and elements of the state space (e.g., the employment decision),
and second, modified structural relationships (e.g., the wage equation). A brief description of the
EMM is presented in the Appendix.
1.4.1 The Auxiliary Statistical Models
The choice of the auxiliary model is crucial for identification of the model. The following 74
auxiliary models was used in estimations.22
1. Regressions of log accepted wages on combinations of linear and squared full-time and part-
time experience, and education indicators estimated for all employed workers, by employment
status and by the number of children.
2. Regressions of log public assistance on combination of age, age squared, indicators for the
number of children and employment type indicators.
3. Logits of employment on combination of linear and squared full-time and part-time experi-
ence, education indicators, indicators for last period’s employment decision estimated for all
employed workers and by the number of children.
4. Logits of program participation on a combination of indicators for employment, education and
the number of children as well as previous program participation and previous employment
status.
22Because the auxiliary models do not represent behaviorally interpretable parameters, their estimates are not presented
in the paper, and are available on request
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5. Logits of EITC on combination of indicators for employment, education and the number of
children as well as previous period EITC eligibility.
6. Multinomial logits of employment on a combination of linear and squared full-time and part-
time experience, education indicators, previous period employment status and previous period
program participation.
7. Logits of work transitions (job to unemployment and unemployment to job) on a combination
of linear and squared full-time and part-time experience, indicators for education and the
number of children.
8. Multinomial logits of transitions from unemployment to no work, part-time or full-time work,
from part-time work to no work, part-time or full-time work, and from full-time work to no
work, part-time or full-time work on combination of linear and squared full-time and part-time
experience, education indicators, and last period program participation.
Based on these auxiliary models, 326 score functions are calculated. Those scores are used to
identify 47 parameters including parameters of the utility function, job offer probabilities, wage
offers and public assistance levels.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Parameter estimates
Tables 1.7 and 1.8 provide a subset of the parameter estimates. The estimates imply that
consumption and leisure are substitutes, αL > 0, and that the marginal disutility of hours of work is
greater for those who have children, αEi1 < αEi0 and αEi2 < αEi0 for i = 1, 2. Transiting from
nonemployment to work is costly: αtr < 0.
The estimates of the job offer probabilities underscore the importance of the labor market frictions.
The probability of receiving a part-time offers starts from 23% per year for those who do not have
market experience and goes up to 76% for those who have median experience: two years of part-time
experience and six years of full-time experience. The probability of receiving a full-time offers starts
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as low as 4% for those who do not have market experience and goes up to 82% for those who have
median experience. The negative effect of nonemployment on the probability of receiving a job offer
is larger for full-time offers than for part-time offers, but the magnitude of both effects decrease with
experience accumulation.
With respect to the estimates of the wage offer function, education has a larger effect on wages for
those who work full-time. Person with some college education may expect higher wages than high
school graduates. Returns to part-time and full-time experience are very different. The maximum
return to full-time experience is achieved at four years of full-time experience for part-time work and
at 14 years of full-time experience for full-time work. Return to part-time experience is negative for
full-time jobs and about 1% wage increase per year of experience for part-time job.
The parameters of public assistance equation suggest that the second child increases the payments
by 42% for nonemployed workers and by 57% for employed. Full-time employment reduces the
payments by 88% compared to payments for those employed part-time.
1.5.2 Model fit
The estimated parameters of the model are used to simulate data consistent with the model
specification. The simulated data should fit the actual data well in the major descriptive statistics:
the proportion of individuals working full-time, part-time and nonemployed; the proportion of
individuals who use public assistance; the proportion of individuals eligible for EITC program.
Table 1.9 provides evidence on the within-sample fit of the model in these tabulations. The model
predictions match the observed fact that women with children are less likely to work and more likely
to be in part-time work than women without children; multiple children make those relations even
more noticeable. Moreover, women with multiple children have a higher probability for participating
in the public assistance programs, while the probability of being eligible for EITC program stays
roughly the same.
It is obviously important that the model captures the structure of payments. Table 1.10 reports
actual and simulated means for the wage, the amount of public assistance, the EITC payments, and
for the state variables. The mean hourly wage decreases with the increase in the number of children
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in the household. This may reflect the effect of the lower employment among mothers as well as
the effect of selection into the number of children by education (education, on the one hand, has a
positive effect on wages, and on the other hand, reduces the probability of pregnancy at each fixed
age). Reported education levels confirm this type of selection since the mean education among those
who do not have children is higher than among those who have.
Average years of full-time experience are higher for women with one child. This result is not
surprising because women with one child on average are 1.8 years older than there counterparts
without children; the difference in full-time experience is only about 0.7 years in actual data.
Interestingly, average years of part-time experience are higher for women with two and more children.
This may reflect the larger disutility of full-time jobs for women with multiple children.
The data on the public assistance amount and on the EITC amount is matched well both, overall
and by the number of children. Clearly, women with children depend more on government programs
than those without children.
Table 1.11 reports statistics on the actual and predicted distributions of wages. This aspect of the
data is crucial for the analysis of the EITC program because the whole distribution of wages, not the
mean wage, determines the amount of EITC payments. The large degree of inequality in the wages
is clear from the table. Full-time wages are considerably higher than part-time wages.
Table 1.12 reports the distribution of children and the pregnancy probability. In the current
version of the model, pregnancy rate parameters are estimated outside of the model and come from
the simple logit for pregnancy.
1.6 Counterfactual Experiments
Once the model parameters are estimated and the model fit is confirmed, the structural parameters
can be used for program evaluation and for counterfactual experiments. The logic of this section
is the following. For each evaluated policy three scenarios are simulated: (1) the EITC program is
available for the whole period of observations - eight years - Actual EITC; (2) the EITC program
is not available for the whole period of observations; and (3) the EITC program is available for the
first five years of observations and is shut off for the last three. Individuals, who were eligible for
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the EITC program for at least three years,23 form the subsample of interest. Individual decisions
under the described three scenarios are compared. Long-term effects of the program are estimated
as a difference in observed dynamics for the last three years between scenarios ”No EITC” and ”5
year EITC availability”. That is, long-term effects are observed if the latter does not converge to the
former.
The four subsections below discuss the effect of the EITC program on employment, evaluation
of the wage changes is not presented here.24
1.6.1 Baseline predictions
Figure 1.1 reports nonemployment, part-time and full-time employment for the three described
scenarios. In the short-run the EITC program reduces nonemployment through the growth of part-
time employment; the proportion of full-time jobs remains unchanged. In the long-run when the
EITC program is shut off (the part of the graph to the right of the red vertical line), employment
proportions return to the no EITC level . Low return to part-time experience explains this dynamics:
lack of wage growth does not make it possible to maintain the new nonemployment level. However,
the higher probability of part-time job offers extends the effect of EITC for one period.
The baseline employment prediction together with the estimated parameters of the wage equation
(Table 1.8) suggest that long-term effect of the program might be generated through full-time
experience accumulation. The three counterfactual experiments are designed to study the ways
to stimulate full-time employment. First, I restrict the use of public assistance to nonemployed
individuals with children. Second, I unilaterally increase the amount of the EITC payments. Third, I
change the amount of the EITC payments such that, given the same earned income level, full-time
workers receive higher payments than part-time workers.
23More precisely, the subsample consists of individuals who were eligible for the EITC program for at least three years
out of the first five.
24If the average wages are compared for all employed workers across three scenarios, then the observed wage dynamics
mixes the effect of sample composition and the effect of wage change. Since the difference in the sample composition
between ”No EITC” and ”5 year EITC availability” is in those who do not work under ”No EITC” (mainly because of
the low wage offers), the average wage under ”5 year EITC availability” is lower than under ”No EITC”. If the issue of
sample composition is addressed through the exclusion of those who have different employment status under these two
scenarios, the average wages become practically identical. Finally, the wage comparison for those who work only under ”5
year EITC availability” is meaningless because their wage is unobserved in ”No EITC” scenario.
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1.6.2 Public assistance restrictions
The explanation for the observed EITC effect in baseline case partly comes from the interaction
between EITC and public assistance benefits. This is especially true for part-time workers (remember
that 45% of them are eligible for EITC and use public assistance - table 1.3). Given the average
amount of public assistance for part-time workers, removal of public assistance for part-time workers
becomes the first solution to be checked.
More specifically, in this experiment public assistance is shut off for all employed individuals.
The results are presented in Figure 1.2. The direct result of this program is increased role of the EITC:
in no EITC scenario nonemployment rate is substantially higher than in the previous simulations.25
The interesting effect is observed when 5 years of EITC availability is compared to actual EITC.
After the EITC program is shut off, part-time employment decreases, full-time employment increases,
keeping the proportion of those who do not work practically unchanged. Intuitively, part-time
employment provides much lower earned income than full-time employment (Table 1.1), and under
the rules of this experiment when EITC becomes unavailable, and other sources of income are absent,
full-time jobs become more attractive.
1.6.3 Unilateral increase in the EITC payments
The alternative solution for the observed adverse effect of the program interaction is to increase
EITC payments. This should have a positive effect on employment and potentially might make
full-time employment more attractive. In this experiment EITC payments are doubled unilaterally
for all workers eligible for EITC.26 The eligibility criteria remain unchanged.
Employment dynamic for this experiment is presented in Figure 1.3. In the short-run increased
EITC payments in fact stimulate employment (nonemployment rates fall). However, this negatively
affects full-time employment and happens purely through increase in part-time employment. It is not
25The counterintuitive dynamics of nonemployment under ”EITC0” is explained by the simulation strategy. In
simulations yr 4 corresponds to the taxation year 1996 - the last year before the welfare reform. The simulations predict
much higher nonemployment rate before the reform when welfare money could be received pretty easily. The next revision
of the paper will include the improved version of the simulation strategy.
26In the presented counterfactual experiments I abstract from the policy budget issues and consider these exercises as a
learning tool which shows the direction of changes, provides some intuition for these directions and estimates the duration
of the EITC consequences.
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surprising, that observed long-term effect on employment is small: nonemployment immediately
returns to no EITC level, part-time and full-time employment do not match it but move really close.
1.6.4 Increase in the EITC payments for full-time workers
This somewhat unexpected result leads to the third experiment: change the incentives within
EITC program. More specifically, EITC payments are tripled for full-time workers and remain
unchanged for part-time workers. It is worth mentioning that the logic of this experiment contradicts
the current logic of the program: EITC payments are calculated based on the earned income amount
and do not take into account the number of hours worked.27 The expectation is that supplementary
benefits for full-time workers will attract more women to full-time jobs, and thus, lead to extra
full-time experience accumulation. This, in turn, will boost wages and lead to long-term employment
stability.
Figure 1.4 presents the employment dynamics under this experiment. The short-term effect of
EITC is clearly shifted towards full-time employment. It is interesting that the proportion of part-time
workers under no EITC and under actual EITC is almost the same. Reduction in nonemployment
goes directly to full-time employment.
The long-term effect of the policy goes in line with predictions. Employment dynamics under 5
years of EITC availability is barely different from the dynamics under actual EITC which means
that individuals continue the stay within the same employment type even after the EITC program is
stopped.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper proposes and estimates a dynamic model of employment and program participation
decisions for a subsample of low-income women from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The
model was used to estimate long-term consequences of the EITC as well as to understand the
mechanisms through which EITC stimulates current employment. The effects of the changes in the
27The implementation of the proposed EITC schedule may be problematic since the income forms reported to IRS by
employers do not contain the information about the form of employment.
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EITC schedule and in the other programs are evaluated using counterfactual experiments.
The estimated model finds insignificant long-term effect of the program on employment which is
noticeable after only about two years. It also highlights the importance of the distinction between
part-time and full-time employment. The estimated parameters of the wage equations show that
while full-time experience generates human capital accumulation, and thus, wage growth, part-time
experience does not increase wages.
Simulations show that the EITC program stimulates part-time, but not full-time employment.
The model suggests that this result comes from the interaction between the EITC and other public
assistance programs. The relative generosity of these programs under part-time employment dis-
courage workers from choosing full-time jobs, and has adverse effect on the long-term profile of the
EITC program.
Counterfactual experiments are designed to test different methods to overcome this program
interaction property. Unilateral increase in the EITC payments does not improve the long-term
employment patterns. In opposite, targeted increase in the EITC payments for full-time work-
ers generates additional full-time employment translated into substantial long-term reduction in
nonemployment.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Monetary outcomes by employment status, in dollars
Unemployed PT employed FT employed Total
Earnings 0 7714 21422 18403
Public assistance (PA) 5929 3715 2276 4251
EITC payment 0 1397 1791 1663
17.6% 18.2% 64.3% 100%
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women age 21-40, non-missing welfare information. The
total number of observations is 4335. Public assistance is considerable comparing to the EITC
payments, especially for part-time workers.
Table 1.2: PA and EITC eligibility by employment status
Unemployed PT employed FT employed Total
No PA participation 28.9 54.1 87.0 71.9
PA participation 71.1 45.9 13.0 28.1
No EITC 100.0 11.9 47.7 47.6
EITC 0.0 88.1 52.3 52.4
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women age 21-40, non-missing welfare information. The
total number of observations is 4335. EITC eligibility is very high for part-time workers.
Table 1.3: Joint distribution of PA participation and EITC eligibility
No earnings Eligible Not eligible Total
No PA participation 2.6 34.6 34.7 71.9
PA participation 10.3 17.8 0.0 28.1
Total 12.9 52.4 34.7 100
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women age 21-40, non-missing welfare
information. The total number of observations is 4335. Program interaction is
important: one third of all workers eligible foro EITC is participating in public
assistance.
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Table 1.4: Joint distribution of PA participation and EITC eligibility by employment status
Unemployed Part-time employed Full-time employed
No earnings Eligible Not eligible Eligible Not eligible
No PA participation 22.8 42.2 11.9 39.3 47.7
PA participation 77.2 45.9 0.0 13.0 0.0
Total 100 88.1 11.9 52.3 47.7
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women age 21-40, non-missing welfare information. The total number
of observations is 4335. Program interaction is extremely important for part-time workers: almost half of
all part-time workers both participate in public assistance and are eligible for EITC.
Table 1.5: EITC eligibility by education levels and the number of
children
No earnings Eligible Not eligible Total
Less than HS 32.8 57.8 9.4 100
HS 13.1 59.1 27.8 100
Some College 3.4 40.8 55.8 100
No children 4.9 12.3 82.8 100
1 child 10.1 65.3 24.6 100
2+ children 19.6 71.3 9.1 100
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women age 21-40, non-missing welfare
information. The total number of observations is 4335. EITC eligible
workers are usually low-educated women with children.
Table 1.6: Probability of pregnancy
Coeff St.Err.
Age -0.069*** 0.018
High School -0.669*** 0.245
Some College -1.250*** 0.273
1 child 0.790*** 0.215
Constant -0.357 0.563
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women
age 21-40, non-missing welfare
information. The total number of
observations is 4335. Logit estimation for
the probability of getting a new child. *** -
significant at 1%.
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Table 1.7: Estimated Parameters
Description Parameter Estimate
Utility Parameters
Leisure αL 2.66
Part-time employment when Kids = 0 αE10 -1.16
Part-time employment when Kids = 1 αE11 -1.85
Part-time employment when Kids = 2 αE12 -1.35
Full-time employment when Kids = 0 αE20 0.10
Full-time employment when Kids = 1 αE21 -1.55
Full-time employment when Kids = 2 αE22 -1.03
Switching costs αtr -1.02
Public assistance participation when Kids = 1 αB11 -0.77
Public assistance participation when Kids = 2 αB12 -0.25
Public assistance participation after the reform αr -1.15
Log Amount of Public Assistance Parameters
Intercept for unemployed γf0 8.31
Two kids γfk2 0.42
Intercept for employed γfe1 7.46
Two kids γfk2e 0.58
Full-time employed, dummy γfe2 -0.88
∗Model parameters are estimated using EMM on a sample of 4335 observations.
Table 1.8: Estimated Parameters
Description Parameter Estimate
Log Wage Offer Parameters part-time full-time
Intercept γ0 1.140 1.689
Full-time experience γ1 0.032 0.028
Part-time experience γ2 0.010 -0.026
Full-time experience squared γ3 -0.007 -0.002
Part-time experience squared γ4 0.000 0.001
Trend γ5 0.087 0.081
HS degree γ6 0.096 0.176
Some college γ7 0.475 0.476
Did not work last period γ8 0.000 -0.813
Variance of wage unobservable σ1 0.539 0.089
Job Offer Logit Parameters part-time full-time
Intercept λ1 -0.537 -1.524
Did not work last period λ2 -0.679 -1.657
Full-time experience λ3 -0.483 1.091
Part-time experience λ4 2.623 -0.916
∗Model parameters are estimated using EMM on a sample of 4335 observations.
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Table 1.9: Model fit by the number of children - non-monetary outcomes
Overall No children 1 child 2+ children
Act Sim Act Sim Act Sim Act Sim
Unemployed 18.3 20.5 7.93 7.49 14.67 19.06 26.19 28.95
PT Employment 17.7 17.8 14.40 13.74 15.98 15.80 20.51 20.45
FT Employment 64.0 61.7 77.67 78.77 69.35 65.14 53.31 50.60
Public assistance (PA) 30.9 34.9 0.0 0.0 29.1 30.9 50.5 52.9
EITC eligibility 48.3 47.3 11.1 10.2 60.5 61.4 65.1 60.2
∗ Actual and predicted percentage of employment, program participation and EITC eligibility: overall and
by the number of children. The comparison is made based on 3,756 non-missing observations.
Table 1.10: Model fit by the number of children - monetary outcomes and state variables
Overall No children 1 child 2+ children
Act Sim Act Sim Act Sim Act Sim
Hourly Wage ($) 10.2 10.1 11.7 10.6 10.6 10.2 8.9 9.7
PA amount ($) 4324.1 4245.4 - - 2972.3 2901.9 4687.1 4541.9
EITC amount ($) 1625.0 1684.0 180.7 196.2 1248.9 1317.0 1936.9 1944.5
Education 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0
Years of FT Experience 7.3 7.1 7.8 7.5 8.5 8.1 6.4 6.6
Years of PT Experience 3.3 3.3 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.6 3.6
Age 31.8 31.8 30.3 30.0 32.1 31.4 32.6 32.9
∗ Actual and predicted means for wage, amount of public assistance, EITC payment amount, and state variables. The
comparison is made based on 3,756 non-missing observations.
Table 1.11: Model fit - wage distribution
Part-time Full-time
Act Sim Act Sim
10th percentile 1.72 2.14 5.00 5.02
25th percentile 3.45 3.78 6.75 6.76
50th percentile 6.67 6.30 10.00 9.60
75th percentile 11.49 10.65 14.00 13.11
90th percentile 20.69 17.38 17.50 17.23
∗ Actual and predicted distribution of wages by employment
status. The comparison is made based on 3,756
non-missing observations.
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Table 1.12: Model fit - children propor-
tions
Act Sim
No children 29.2 25.6
One child 22.5 20.4
Two or more children 48.3 54.0
Pregnancy probability 3.0 4.4
∗ Actual and predicted proportions of
women with zero, one, and two and more
children. The comparison is made based on
3,756 non-missing observations.
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Figure 1.1: Baseline Scenario: Long-term effect of the EITC program on employment
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Figure 1.2: Public Assistance Restrictions: Long-term effect of the EITC program on employment
0
.
0
5
.
1
.
1
5
.
2
.
2
5
.
3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
yr
No EITC
Actual EITC
5 years of EITC
Nonemployment
0
.
0
5
.
1
.
1
5
.
2
.
2
5
.
3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
yr
No EITC
Actual EITC
5 years of EITC
Part-time employment
.
6
.
6
5
.
7
.
7
5
.
8
.
8
5
.
9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
yr
No EITC
Actual EITC
5 years of EITC
Full-time employment
28
Figure 1.3: Unilateral increase in EITC: Long-term effect of the EITC program on employment
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Figure 1.4: Increase in EITC for full-time workers: Long-term effect of the EITC program on employment
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Appendix
Utility Function: Full Specification
uat = ln(Cat) + αL ln(Lat) + αB,K + αE,K + αrI(t > 1996)+
+αtr[I(Eat > 0|E(a−1)(t−1) = 0) + I(Eat = 0|E(a−1)(t−1) > 0)] + εat,E,B
where
αE,K =
2∑
e=0
2∑
k=0
αEekI(Eat = e)I(Kat = k)
αB,K =
min {1,k}∑
b=0
2∑
k=0
αBbkI(Bat = b)I(Kat = k), αB0k = 0
EMM Estimator
Let yA represent actual data and ΘA be a vector of parameters in a set of auxiliary relationships.
At the maximum likelihood estimate, Θ̂A, the score of the likelihood function with respect to the
actual data must be zero: ∂L(yA,Θ̂A)∂ΘA = 0. Let yB represent the data simulated in the behavioral
model using a vector of parameters ΘB . Then the optimal vector Θ̂B should generate such data
yB(Θ̂B) that the score functions evaluated at the simulated data are as close to zero as possible:
Θ̂B = arg min
ΘB
∂L(yB(ΘB), Θ̂A)
∂ΘA
Λ
∂L(yB(ΘB), Θ̂A)
∂ΘA
.
The weighting matrix Λ is a block diagonal matrix, where each of the diagonal matrices is the inverse
of the Hessian of an auxiliary model evaluated at the actual data.
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Chapter 2
Life-long Consequences of the EITC
Program
2.1 Introduction
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is an earnings subsidy that was introduced to stimulate
employment among low-skilled workers. This is one of the largest and most influential poverty
reduction programs in the US1. However, long-term effects of the program are still not fully evaluated.
This paper addresses the following question. Are there any life-long improvements in the employment
profiles of single mothers as a result of employment stimulating programs?
It is a well-documented fact that the EITC program stimulates short-term employment for single
mothers (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Hotz et al., 2005; Eissa and Hoynes,
2006). Over time this extra employment can be translated into better employment opportunities
through several channels. First of all, more experience may lead to a human capital accumulation
and transfer into a future wage growth. Moreover, the exposure to the labor markets may shorten
individual’s unemployment spells by increasing the work experience as well as experience in job
search. Finally, employment stimulation may improve working culture, and thus, affect positively
both wages and job offer arrival rates (Pavetti and Acs, 2001).
1Estimates suggest that the EITC lifts about 5 million households above the federal poverty line each year. In 2009, 27
million of the EITC returns generated a total payment to recipients of about $60 billion.
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Even though theoretical literature suggests those long-term effects, empirical estimations provide
contradicting conclusions. For example, longer experience on part-time jobs may have little effect
on future employment patterns because it does not stimulate the human capital accumulation, and
thus, does not improve wage profiles. Looney and Manoli (2011) find no effect of additional years of
experience on the earnings, wages, or employment opportunities of single mothers in 1990s.
In this paper I study the life-long labor supply response of single women with children to the
expansions of the EITC program in 1980s and 1990s. I focus on single women with children because
they are the largest group of the taxpayers eligible for the EITC. More than 70% of EITC recipients
are single, both in terms of the number of returns and total amount paid; 60% of single women with
children receive EITC benefits (Plueger, 2009).
The goal of this paper is to clarify the role of the EITC program in the long-term employment
behavior of single mothers. The positive life-long effect of the EITC program may justify the increase
in the government-sponsored employment stimulation: the increase in the employment probability of
those who are not eligible anymore may reduce the government expenses in other poverty reduction
programs such as subsidised housing, food stamps, etc.
The effects of the EITC program on life-long employment are estimated using the framework
of a natural experiment. I compare the change in the labor supply of two groups of single women
whose children have left the household: the first group includes women who had children during the
generous stage of the EITC program and the second group includes women who had children during
the moderate stage of the program. At the moment of interest - namely, when the youngest child
reaches age eighteen - both groups do not have access to the EITC program because they do not meet
the requirement of having children in the household2. However, the exposure to the EITC program in
the past for those two treated groups was different.
To define the term ”exposure to the EITC program” the endogeneity issue should be discussed
here. Suppose that the sample is restricted to women who actually received the tax credit in the
past. Then this sample includes those who would work even without the EITC support but received
some monetary supplement and those who would not work without the EITC, but were moved
2I account for the changes in the labor market conditions between these two periods using the control group of women
without children.
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to employment as a result of the program. However, this sample excludes those who were not
stimulated by the EITC program and remained non-employed. The selection becomes an issue
because individuals may self-select into those groups based on some unobserved characteristics.
To address this problem I include in the sample all women who meet all but one (earned income)
eligibility requirements and I call these requirements ”exposure to the EITC program”. Thus, the
sample consists of women who are potentially eligible to the EITC benefits if they meet the earned
income requirement3.
The effects of the EITC program on the long-term employment are estimated on the PSID data
using the logistic model with individual fixed-effects. The sample consists of 41209 observations
and 5836 of individuals over years 1968 and 2007 and split into four regimes: ”No EITC” - before
the introduction of the EITC program in 1975, ”Moderate EITC” - between the introduction and the
first major expansion in 1986 (TRA86), ”Transition” - between the two major expansions in 1986
and 1993 (TRA86 and OBRA93), and ”Generous EITC” - after the second major expansion in 1993
(OBRA93)4. The long-term effect is divided into two subperiods: the effect one to five years after
the exposure to the program and the effect more than five years after the exposure. The regression
controls for demographic characteristics such as age, education level, age of the youngest child, etc.
The short-term effects of the EITC program are estimated to be positive: the EITC program
stimulates single women with children to work more. These findings are consistent with the previously
documented results (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006; Dickert et al., 1995; Grogger, 2003). The life-long
effects of the EITC program are found to be insignificant. The exposure to the EITC in the previous
years does not generate higher labor market participation for single woman whose children have left
the household.
Several specifications were used to check the robustness of these results. Two different base
levels are chosen: the comparison is done against the ”Moderate EITC” regime as well as against the
”No EITC” regime. The division of the long-term effects was modified: the three subgroups include
(1) the effect one to five years after the exposure to the program, (2) the effect five to ten years after
3Historical participation rates for the EITC program are more than 80% and even higher for those who are eligible for
maximum credit (White, 2001). That said, it is reasonable to assume that single women who meet all but one requirement
are aware of the EITC program.
4Brief description of the EITC program and its expansions can be found in Section 2.2.
34
the exposure, and (3) the effect more than ten years after the exposure. All those modifications do
not alter the results substantially.
Two remarks should be made here. First, unlike the standard natural experiments where the
policy change is usually supposed to be unexpected to the program participants, the eligibility
change considered in this paper is perfectly predictable and depends on the children’s age. One may
argue that predictability of the policy change may affect individual’s behavior and lead to incorrect
conclusions. However, the main idea in this paper is to estimate life-long effect of the EITC, and thus,
to take into account not only the short-term decisions, but also the decisions which depend on the past
and the future anticipated changes in the program. Another possible concern is potential endogeneity.
Since the EITC eligibility depends on children’s age, the household may postpone the eligibility
lost by changing their fertility choices. That in fact could be a problem, but the empirical literature
suggests that both marriage and fertility choices are not affected by the EITC policy (Baughman and
Dickert-Conlin, 2003, 2009).
Second, I would like to stress here that I do not estimate the effect of the EITC participation, but
rather the effect of the existing EITC rules during the years of active child bearing for single mothers
(effect of potential eligibility). There are two reasons for that: (1) it allows me to estimate the actual
observed effect in the society, not the hypothetical effect only on those who are directly affected by
this program; and (2) it solves the selection problem - actually EITC participants might be different
from those who were not receiving EITC payments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides brief policy description.
Section 2.3 describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 discusses estimation
method and identification strategy. Results and their interpretations are presented in Section 2.5.
Section 2.6 offers some final thoughts.
2.2 EITC Facts
This section provides a brief overview of the Earned Income Tax Credit. Detailed description of
the program can be found in Eissa and Hoynes (2006).
The Earned Income Tax Credit was introduced in 1975 as a modest program to offset payroll
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taxes and to stimulate employment for low-income families with children. The program is designed
as a cash transfer to low-income working families through the tax system. The EITC is refundable
so that, for example, a taxpayer with no federal tax liability would receive a tax refund from the
government for the full amount of the credit.
The amount of credit depends on two types of household characteristics: monetary (the taxpayers
earned income and adjusted gross income), and non-monetary (since 1991, the number of EITC-
eligible children in the household, and since 2001, the marital status of the head). There are three
regions in the credit schedule (Figure 2.1). The credit for those in the phase-in region is equal to the
subsidy rate times their earnings. In the flat region, the family receives the maximum credit; while in
the phase-out region the credit is going down at the phase-out rate. Table 2.1 represents the EITC
rules over time: phase-in and phase-out rates as well as the earned income levels at the turning points
and the amount of the maximum credit.
Since introduction in 1975, the program was expanded several times: in the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (TRA86), and in the Omnibus Reconciliation Acts in 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90 and OBRA93).
These expansions have led to a sharp increase in both, the total number of recipients and the costs
of the program. Figure 2.2 plots the number of EITC recipients and the total costs of the program
in 2006 dollars. The figure clearly shows the rising expenditures and recipients associated with the
1986, 1990, and 1993 tax acts.
Figure 2.1 illustrates these expansions in terms of the individual EITC schedule. The graphs
show the chances in the real EITC payment schedule for single taxpayers with the changes in real
earned income depending on the number of children in the household.
This paper focuses on the two major expansions of the EITC program: TRA86 and OBRA93.
The first expansion (TRA86) shifted the maximum earned income of the household with one child
eligible for the EITC from $20,000 in 1984 to $32,000 in 1988 in real terms (in 2006 dollars). This
happens because of the three simultaneous changes: increase in the phase-in rate, increase in the
minimum earned income required for the maximum credit, and lengthening of the flat credit region.
and thus, significantly expanded the pool of eligible households. The third expansion (OBRA93)
followed the second (OBRA90) in increasing the generosity of the payments. From Figure 2.1 we
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can notice that the 1993 expansion was much larger for families with two or more children than for
families with one child. For example, between 1993 and 2006, single mothers with two children
earning between $15,000 and $25,000 (in 2006 dollars) experienced a more than doubling in their
real transfer from the EITC. In contrast, single mothers with one child earning $15,000 (in real
2006 dollars) experienced about a 40 percent increase in the real EITC, while those earning $25,000
experienced about a 25 percent increase in the real EITC.
At every level of earnings the EITC amount after every expansion was at least as large as it was
before the expansion. Therefore, theory predicts that labor force participation of eligible taxpayers
should increase in response to the expansion. The question is whether this increased labor force
participation is transferred into a better employment opportunities in the long-run.
2.3 Data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a primary source of data in this paper. This
study started in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of over 18,000 individuals living in
5,000 families in the United States. Information on these individuals and their descendants has been
collected continuously, including data covering employment, income, marriage, childbearing and
education.
To answer the questions posed above we need data which satisfies several requirements. Firstly,
it should be a survey long enough to estimate long-term effects. SIPP, a natural choice for estimating
effects of different programs, is not an ideal survey here because a wave length is too short. Second,
it should contain information about employment choices and a job history. PSID allows for retrieving
demographics and the job history.
A potential problem with PSID data is the biannual nature of the data collection in recent
years (starting from 1997). However, supplementary files on employment choices are available and
allow recovering employment information even though detailed part-time and full-time employment
remains unavailable for years 2002, 2004 and 2006.
The sample consists of single women with or without children between ages 18 and 61. The
upper bound for the age range is chosen to be 61 to avoid discussions of a potential early retirement.
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Only PSID core sample is used for estimations. In addition, any individual who reports disability or
school participation is excluded. In order to focus on the people who are actually affected by the
EITC program, sample does not include women with college degree: the proportion of women with
college degree who are eligible for the EITC is much smaller than the proportion of women with
lower education who are eligible (see Table 2.4). Moreover, the other characteristics such as the
number of children and the probability of employment are also different (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
The final panel consists of 5836 individuals with 41209 person-year observations.
Based on the structure of the EITC reforms (Table 2.1) all years are divided into four EITC
regimes. Introduction of the EITC program, TRA86 and OBRA93 are taken as a turning points in
the EITC dynamics. Therefore, the ”EITC regime” variable takes on four values: ”No EITC (0)” for
the years before the EITC program was introduced (1968-1974); ”Moderate EITC (1)” for the years
between the introduction of the program and the first major expansion (1975-1986); ”Transition (2)”
for the years between the two major reforms5 (1987-1993); and ”Generous EITC (3)” for the years
after the OBRA93 (1994-2007).
Table 2.5 presents summary statistics for three groups of women: women without children,
women without children who did not have children before, and women with children. There are
some noticeable differences between the two groups. Those who have children tend on average to be
less educated (for example, in ”Transition” the proportion of those without high school degree was
33.8 versus 16.1 and 25.9, respectively) and less likely to be employed (for example, in ”Transition”
those probabilities are 0.68 versus 0.87 and 0.82, respectively). The average age of those who have
children is closer to those who have not had children yet. This table also shows the dynamics of these
descriptive characteristics within the group over time. For example, the education level rises over
time as well as employment rate.
Table 2.5 suggests that any raw differences in labor market outcomes over time between the
treatment and control groups must be interpreted with caution. The difference in the descriptive
characteristics of the groups may reflect the issue of self-selection: people with some characteristics
may be affected by outside shocks differently from people with other characteristics. The estimation
5This is a regime characterized by several changes in the EITC which led to considerable expansion of the EITC
benefits. It should be viewed as a transition period between ”Moderate EITC” regime and ”Generous EITC” regime.
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method is chosen to account for these concerns.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
Estimation method is a modification of the strategy proposed by Eissa and Liebman (1996). The
idea is to compare the labor force participation of single women who faced different EITC regimes
while raising children and whose children have already left the household.
There are several identification issues here. Let Erit be employment decision of a woman i in
year t who had children under EITC regime r and let t¯ri be her last year of the exposure to the EITC
regime r. Then the ideal comparison of the effect of moderate and generous regimes (regimes 1 and
3) should be E3it − E1it where individual i and year t are the same. Unfortunately, this difference is
unobserved because an individual in a certain year cannot be treated with bundles (regime 1, not
regime 3) and (regime 3, not regime 1) at the same time. Moreover, the difference E3jt − E1it, where
individuals i and j are similar in their characteristics, does not identify the desirable effect of the
EITC program either. In this case the time difference between employment at time t and the last
exposure to the EITC program t¯1i is much larger than the time difference between employment at
time t and t¯3j .
The alternative comparison of the regimes should control for the time since the last EITC
exposure:
E3jt3 − E1it1
where t3 and t1 are such that t3 − t¯3j = t1 − t¯1i . For example, this suggests that the employment
decision of a woman in year 1997 whose child left the household in year 1996 should be compared
to the employment decision of a similar woman in year 1984 whose child left the household in year
1983. It becomes clear here that this simple comparison does not isolate the pure impact of the EITC
program because it does not control for the changes in the labor market conditions such as differences
in the unemployment rates, changes in the government support policy, etc.
The solution to this problem can be found within a difference-in-difference framework. Let
women who were exposed to the EITC program be in the treatment group, and women who were not
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exposed to the EITC program (for instance, because they did not have children at the moment) be in
the control group. Then the variable of interest is
(E3jt3 − E1it1)− (Ej′t3 − Ei′t1)
where i′ and j′ are the individuals who are similar in their characteristics to individuals i and j,
respectively, but who were not exposed to the EITC program in their past. The required identifying
assumption is that the market conditions affect pairs of individuals i, i′ and j, j′ in the same way.
The estimation equation that controls for the individual characteristics and the labor market
conditions is:
Eit = β0 +
3∑
r=2
βrRR
r
it +Xitβ + it (2.1)
where Rrit is an indicator of the EITC exposure: R
r
it = 1 if a person i at time t has already been
exposed to the EITC regime r6. Xit includes individual’s age and education level, the current number
of children, the age of the youngest child, the interaction between the number of children and the
education level, year trend and the dummy variable for the years after the 1996 welfare reform
interacted with the number of children.
The coefficient βrR estimates the effect of the exposure to the EITC under regime r on individual
employment decisions. This estimate is an average across contemporaneous effects of the EITC
exposure and all long-term effects that are observed after the exposure to the EITC regime is over.
To separate the short-term (contemporaneous) and long-term effects of the EITC exposure
equation 2.1 requires some modifications.
Eit = β0 +
3∑
r=2
[βrR1I(ER
r
it = 1) + β
r
R2I(ER
r
it = 2) + β
r
R3I(ER
r
it = 3)] +Xitβ + it (2.2)
where ERrit is the extended regime variable: it takes value 1 if person i is exposed to regime r in
year t, value 2 if person i was exposed to regime r one to five years before year t, and value 3 if
person i was exposed to regime r more than five years before year t. In this setup the coefficient
6The following example illustrates that the index t in Rrit is not redundant. Let i had children under regime 2 (e.g.,
between years 1990-1994). Then R2i1997 = 1, but R
2
i1982 = 0. Moreover, even years within the regime 2 but before the
child was born has a zero indicator: R2i1989 = 0.
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βR1 estimates the contemporaneous effect of the EITC program and the coefficients βR2 and βR3
estimate the average prolonged effects of the two disjoint time periods.
2.5 Results
The model presented in Section 2.4 is estimated on the sample from the PSID using the logistic
regressions. Regression results for employment probabilities for single women are presented in
Tables 2.6 - 2.8.
2.5.1 Reference estimates
Table 2.6 shows the results for the reference equations (see equation 2.1). The first two columns
provide results for a simple logistic regression while the third and the forth columns provide results
for a logistic regression with fixed effects.
In the first column logistic regression is run for women who had children under ”Moderate”
regime as a base level. All demographic characteristics are significant: the probability to be employed
is lower for women with children, higher for more educated women, higher for women with children
after the welfare reform of 1996 and lower when unemployment rate is high. Employment probability
is estimated to be lower for women who had children under ”Transition” (coefficient -0.162) and
higher for women who had children under ”Generous EITC” (coefficient 0.210) than for women
who had children under ”Moderate EITC”. The second column provides similar estimates for the
alternative base level (women with children before the EITC reform). Here, the effect of ”Moderate
EITC” is positive, the effect of ”Transition” is negative, and the effect of ”Generous EITC” is positive
(coefficients 0.102, -0.171, and -.223, respectively).
The switching signs and the significance level for the ”Moderate EITC” variable in the logistic
regressions are puzzling. The literature suggests that the EITC program has a positive effect on
employment of single women. Moreover, data description (Section 2.3) shows that the treatment and
the control groups are different in their observed demographic characteristics. This may suggest that
individual unobserved characteristics are important and affect the estimation.
Columns three and four of Table 2.6 account for the unobserved heterogeneity and estimate
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equation 2.1 using the logistic regression with fixed effects7. These regressions control for the
unobserved factors which are correlated with demographic characteristics and which may affect
women’s employment decisions over time. In this specification all three regimes are estimated to have
positive effect on employment probabilities for single women. Moreover, the effect is monotonically
increasing with the generosity of the EITC program. The coefficient for ”Moderate EITC” is positive
and insignificant while the coefficients for ”Transition” and ”Generous EITC” are highly significant.
The estimates for the demographic characteristics do not change signs comparing to the estimates in
columns (1) and (2).
2.5.2 Full specification estimates
Methodologically the estimated effects of the EITC are a mixture of the short-term (contem-
poraneous) and the long-term effects of the program. Equation 2.2 is estimated to separate those
effects. Since the estimates presented in the Table 2.6 indicate the importance of the unobserved
heterogeneity in the employment estimations, only results of logistic regressions with fixed effects
are discussed here8.
Table 2.7 provides the results for the basic specification. The coefficients of interest are ”have
children under regime X right now”, ”had children under regime X 1-5 years ago” and ”had children
under regime X 5+ years ago”. Columns (5) and (6) reports the results for the ”Moderate EITC” as a
base level. The coefficients for the contemporaneous effects are all positive and highly significant
while most of the other coefficients are not significant (positive or negative). Columns (7) and (8)
present the results for the alternative base level. The pattern for the coefficients for ”Transition” and
”Generous EITC” does not change while the coefficients for ”Moderate EITC” are insignificant.
The comparison of the results for two base levels goes in line with the description of the first
EITC regime as ”moderate”. Both in the reference and in the detailed estimations the effect of
”Moderate EITC” is estimated to be insignificant and much smaller than the effects of the later
regimes.
7The regressions are estimated on the smaller samples because all observations with all positive or all negative outcomes
are dropped.
8For completeness results for regular logistic regressions are reported in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 as well.
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The estimates for ”Generous EITC” are pretty straightforward: positive significant contempora-
neous effects are followed by highly insignificant long-term effects. Unfortunately, this conclusion
cannot be extended to the ”Transition”. Even though the contemporaneous effect remains positive
and significant, the long-term effects are confusing: positive and significant for ”5+ years ago” in
specifications (5) and (7) and negative and significant for ”1-5 years ago” in specifications (6) and
(8).
The coefficients for the basic demographic characteristics do not change much comparing to the
reference estimates from Table 2.6. This may indicate that inconsistent results for regime 2 are not a
sign of low power of the whole estimation, but a result of some features of regime 2 data9.
Columns (1)-(4) provide the estimation results for a regular logistic regression. The comparison
between the first four columns and the second four columns shows the difference in estimates due to
unobserved heterogeneity.
2.5.3 Robustness check
Robustness check is performed to evaluate the stability of the observed results. The obvious
modification of the variables of interest comes from the arbitrary division of the long-term EITC
effects into two subgroups: ”1-5 years ago” and ”5+ years ago”. The alternative definition allows for
three subgroups: ”1-5 years ago”, ”5-10 years ago” and ”10+ years ago”10.
The results for the alternative specification are presented in Table 2.8. It is interesting to compare
column (6) in Table 2.8 with column (5) from Table 2.7. They are different only in the definition of
one dummy: ”5-10 years ago” versus ”5+ years ago”. The estimated effects of ”Generous EITC”
in Table 2.8 are similar to the original estimations: positive and significant contemporaneous effect
and insignificant long-term effects. The contemporaneous effect of ”Transition” remains positive
and significant. However, the long-term effects are changing: ”1-5 years ago” becomes negative and
slightly significant while ”5-10 years ago” is much smaller than ”5+ years ago” (0.264 in column (6)
9Additional research is needed to identify the reasons for the regime 2 coefficients to be unstable. One of the possible
explanation is that regime 2 aggregates years before and after OBRA90, and thus, the estimated coefficients are a mixture
of multiple effects.
10The alternative definition is less preferable than the original one because the subsample that identifies the coefficient
”10+ years ago” for the ”Generous EITC” is very small.
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of Table 2.8 versus 0.637 in column (5) of Table 2.7). Coefficients for ”1-5 years ago” and ”5+ years
ago” almost cancel each other. Similar pattern is observed when column (8) of Table 2.8 is compared
to column (7) of Table 2.7. The effects of ”Moderate EITC” remain insignificant.
The alternative specification confirms the findings that even though the EITC program stimulates
employment in the short-run, it does not generate positive long-term effects. The coefficients for the
”Transition” regime remain unstable.
In light of these results it would be interesting to verify the results of Blank (2012). This paper
concludes that women who move to employment because of the EITC program tend to work on
the part-time jobs and do not gain enough experience required for improvement in employment
opportunities. Unfortunately, right now this estimation is not feasible because the distinction between
part-time and full-time employment is unavailable in PSID for the years 2002, 2004 and 2006 (due
to the biannual nature of the survey).
2.5.4 Discussion
The reasons for the insignificant long-term effects of the EITC program on employment cannot
be fully evaluated within the difference-in-difference framework. However, this results are consistent
with some theoretical predictions. For example, single women who become employed as a result of
the EITC program are attracted to part-time jobs which do not generate enough experience and do
not improve their wage profiles.
One may argue that the findings are related to the construction of the natural experiment. The
treatment group consists of single women ”exposed to the EITC regime”, not the ”participated”
women and not even ”eligible” women. However, if that would be an issue, contemporaneous effects
of the program should also have been insignificant which is not the case.
I would also like to emphasize the average nature of the estimated effects. It is well known that
the difference-in-difference approach estimates the average effect across individuals with different
characteristics. However, in this particular setup there are at least two other dimensions that were
averaged out.
The first dimension is the number of children in the household during the exposure to the EITC
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program. Neither equation 2.1 nor equation 2.2 controls for that dimension. However, the effect of
the EITC on labor market participation for single women might differ for households with different
numbers of children. It is hard to predict the direction of this dependence. For example, a single
woman with multiple children may be able to find a better job leaving younger children with their
older siblings (being more flexible with her working hours). On the contrary, a single woman with
only one child may devote more time to the labor market participation. The model estimates the
average effect for the sample.
The second dimension is the length of exposure to a certain EITC regime. In the current
specification the exposure to the tax credit is marked only as ”Right now”. There is no indication for
the number of years a person was observed under each of the EITC regimes. That means that the
estimated effect is an average effect across those who were exposed to the EITC program for the
whole variety of years (for some individuals that would be only one year and for others - more than
ten years). Obviously, those effects might be different.
2.6 Conclusion
Does the EITC program improve the employment profile of the low-skilled workers beyond the
eligibility years? Do single women tend to stay employed after their children leave the household?
The paper studies the correlation between the observed exposure to the EITC program in the past
and the current employment probabilities. The estimation results indicate that even though the EITC
program stimulates employment in the short-run, there are no significant long-term improvements in
the labor force participation of single women.
The results are robust to the base period changes as well as to the changes in the definition of the
long-term effects. Inconsistent results for the transition period between the two major EITC reforms
leave the room for the further research. The average nature of the proposed estimator suggests that
there might be some positive effect for certain subgroups which are exposed to the EITC program for
an extended period of time.
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Figure 2.1: EITC Schedules for Single Mothers by the number of children (real terms)
Tables and Figures
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Figure 2.2: EITC Schedules for Single Mothers by the number of children (real terms)
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Table 2.1: Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters, 1975-2008
Calendar Year
Credit Minimum Phaseout Phaseout range
rate income for Maximum rate Beginning Ending
(percent) max credit credit (percent) income income
1975 - 78 10 4,000 400 10 4,000 8,000
1979 - 84 10 5,000 500 12.5 6,000 10,000
1985 - 86 14 5,000 550 12.22 6,500 11,000
1987 14 6,080 851 10 6,920 15,432
1988 14 6,240 874 10 9,840 18,576
1989 14 6,500 910 10 10,240 19,340
1990 14 6,810 953 10 10,730 20,264
1991
One child 16.7 7,140 1,192 11.93 11,250 21,250
Two children 17.3 7,140 1,235 12.36 11,250 21,250
1992
One child 17.6 7,520 1,324 12.57 11,840 22,370
Two children 18.4 7,520 1,384 13.14 11,840 22,370
1993
One child 18.5 7,750 1,434 13.21 12,200 23,050
Two children 19.5 7,750 1,511 13.93 12,200 23,050
1994
No children 7.65 4,000 306 7.65 5,000 9,000
One child 26.3 7,750 2,038 15.98 11,000 23,755
Two children 30 8,425 2,528 17.68 11,000 25,296
1995
No children 7.65 4,100 314 7.65 5,130 9,230
One child 34 6,160 2,094 15.98 11,290 24,396
Two children 36 8,640 3,110 20.22 11,290 26,673
1996
No children 7.65 4,220 323 7.65 5,280 9,500
One child 34 6,330 2,152 15.98 11,610 25,078
Two children 40 8,890 3,556 21.06 11,610 28,495
1997
No children 7.65 4,340 332 7.65 5,430 9,770
One child 34 6,500 2,210 15.98 11,930 25,750
Two children 40 9,140 3,656 21.06 11,930 29,290
1998
No children 7.65 4,460 341 7.65 5,570 10,030
One child 34 6,680 2,271 15.98 12,260 26,473
Two children 40 9,390 3,756 21.06 12,260 30,095
1999
No children 7.65 4,530 347 7.65 5,670 10,200
One child 34 6,800 2,312 15.98 12,460 26,928
Two children 40 9,540 3,816 21.06 12,460 30,580
2000
No children 7.65 4,610 353 7.65 5,770 10,380
One child 34 6,920 2,353 15.98 12,690 27,413
Two children 40 9,720 3,888 21.06 12,690 31,152
2001
No children 7.65 4,760 364 7.65 5,950 10,710
One child 34 7,140 2,428 15.98 13,090 28,281
Two children 40 10,020 4,008 21.06 13,090 32,121
2002
No children 7.65 4,910 376 7.65 6,150 11,060
One child 34 7,370 2,506 15.98 13,520 29,201
Two children 40 10,350 4,140 21.06 13,520 33,178
2003
No children 7.65 4,990 382 7.65 6,240 11,230
One child 34 7,490 2,547 15.98 13,730 29,666
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Calendar Year
Credit Minimum Phaseout Phaseout range
rate income for Maximum rate Beginning Ending
(percent) max credit credit (percent) income income
Two children 40 10,510 4,204 21.06 13,730 33,692
2004
No children 7.65 5,100 390 7.65 6,390 11,490
One child 34 7,660 2,604 15.98 14,040 30,338
Two children 40 10,750 4,300 21.06 14,040 34,458
2005
No children 7.65 5,220 399 7.65 6,530 11,750
One child 34 7,830 2,662 15.98 14,370 31,030
Two children 40 11,000 4,400 21.06 14,370 35,263
2006
No children 7.65 5,380 412 7.65 6,740 12,120
One child 34 8,080 2,747 15.98 14,810 32,001
Two children 40 11,340 4,536 21.06 14,810 36,348
2007
No children 7.65 5,590 428 7.65 7,000 12,590
One child 34 8,390 2,853 15.98 15,390 33,241
Two children 40 11,790 4,716 21.06 15,390 37,783
* Beginning in 2002, the values of the beginning and ending points
of the phase-out range were increased for married taxpayers filing jointly.
The values for these taxpayers were $1,000 higher than the listed values
from 2002-2004 and $2,000 higher from 2005-2007.
Sources:
1975-2003: Joint Committee on Taxation; Ways and Means Committee, 2004 Green Book.
2004-2007: Internal Revenue Service, Form 1040 Instructions.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of educational levels by the number of children
in the household
Education level
less than HS HS some college college Total
no children 20.8 35.9 22.0 21.3 100.0
1 child 26.0 43.2 23.7 7.1 100.0
2+ children 36.8 41.4 17.7 4.1 100.0
Total 27.5 39.4 20.9 12.2 100.0
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women age 18-61, years 1968-2007. The total
number of observations is 54869. Most single women with children do not have a
college degree.
Table 2.3: Proportion of employed women, by education level
and by the EITC regime years
Education level
less than HS HS some college college
”No EITC” 60.0 78.9 89.7 96.6
”Moderate” 55.7 80.4 88.6 96.4
”Transition” 52.8 79.9 89.6 95.4
”Generous” 61.5 83.6 91.4 95.8
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women age 18-61, years 1968-2007.
The total number of observations is 54869. Employment rates are rising
with education level.
Table 2.4: Proprotion of EITC eligible women among those who
work, by education level and by the EITC regime years
Education level
less than HS HS some college college
”No EITC” 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
”Moderate” 51.8 35.4 23.5 4.6
”Transition” 55.3 41.6 32.5 6.9
”Generous” 75.4 59.9 46.7 14.9
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women age 18-61, years 1968-2007.
The total number of observations is 40473. EITC eligibility rates are
falling with education level and rising with EITC expansion.
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics, by the EITC regime years
Without children
”No EITC” ”Moderate” ”Transition” ”Generous”
Age 44.2 40.7 41.7 41.2
(13.9) (14.5) (13.2) (12.6)
Education:
less than HS 51.6 35.4 25.9 16.5
HS 34.8 45.6 46.2 46.5
some college 13.6 19.0 27.9 36.9
Nonwhite 0.476 0.481 0.449 0.459
(0.500) (0.500) (0.497) (0.498)
Employment rate 0.787 0.799 0.821 0.840
(0.410) (0.401) (0.383) (0.366)
Without children (never had)
”No EITC” ”Moderate” ”Transition” ”Generous”
Age 42.9 32.1 33.4 32.2
(14.6) (13.4) (11.8) (11.1)
Education:
less than HS 48.8 20.4 16.1 10.0
HS 35.8 51.9 49.2 45.5
some college 15.4 27.6 34.7 44.5
Nonwhite 0.452 0.395 0.337 0.395
(0.498) (0.489) (0.473) (0.489)
Employment rate 0.812 0.874 0.870 0.901
(0.391) (0.332) (0.337) (0.298)
With children
”No EITC” ”Moderate” ”Transition” ”Generous”
Age 37.6 34.6 34.3 35.8
(10.6) (10.6) (9.1) (8.9)
Education:
less than HS 60.1 46.9 33.8 22.8
HS 32.6 40.4 44.7 48.5
some college 7.2 12.8 21.5 28.7
Nonwhite 0.757 0.755 0.687 0.739
(0.429) (0.430) (0.464) (0.439)
Employment rate 0.639 0.655 0.684 0.803
(0.480) (0.475) (0.465) (0.398)
∗ Note: PSID data, sample of single women age 18-61, years 1968-2007. The total number of
observations is 41209. Numbers in parenthesis represent standard errors. Demographic
characteristics and employment rates by the EITC regimes for samples of those who have
children and those who do not have children. Education level and employment rates vary
over time.
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Table 2.6: Regression results - reference group
Logistic regression Logistic regression with FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Had children during
”Moderate EITC” 0.102*** 0.201
(0.0338) (0.161)
”Transition” -0.162*** -0.171*** 0.323*** 0.324***
(0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0982) (0.0972)
”Generous EITC” 0.210*** 0.223*** 0.348*** 0.351***
(0.0607) (0.0606) (0.104) (0.104)
Children
1 -0.785*** -0.808*** -0.982*** -0.883***
(0.0773) (0.0766) (0.156) (0.152)
2+ -1.315*** -1.356*** -1.594*** -1.535***
(0.0642) (0.0641) (0.145) (0.141)
Age 0.0673*** 0.0599*** 0.271*** 0.261***
(0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0247) (0.0241)
Age squared -0.00133*** -0.00125*** -0.00434*** -0.00421***
(0.000133) (0.000131) (0.000294) (0.000285)
Education
High school (HS) 1.345*** 1.338*** 0.381** 0.452**
(0.0574) (0.0564) (0.188) (0.183)
Some college (SC) 1.882*** 1.895*** 0.716*** 0.760***
(0.0824) (0.0820) (0.251) (0.246)
Age of the youngest child 0.0471*** 0.0473*** 0.0398*** 0.0400***
(0.00419) (0.00412) (0.00728) (0.00711)
Children-Education Interaction
HS and 1 child -0.365*** -0.370*** -0.211 -0.319*
(0.0875) (0.0861) (0.183) (0.178)
HS and 2+ children -0.517*** -0.514*** -0.296* -0.372**
(0.0728) (0.0715) (0.175) (0.171)
SC and 1 child -0.432*** -0.464*** 0.00588 -0.0519
(0.122) (0.121) (0.243) (0.238)
SC and 2+ children -0.317*** -0.333*** -0.0738 -0.106
(0.110) (0.109) (0.247) (0.240)
Calendar year -0.000499 0.000760
(0.00355) (0.00331)
Welfare dummy X Children
After the reform and no children -0.245*** -0.284*** -0.426*** -0.433***
(0.0849) (0.0854) (0.158) (0.156)
After the reform and 1 child 0.135 0.137 0.319* 0.312*
(0.105) (0.105) (0.166) (0.165)
After the reform and 2 children 0.515*** 0.536*** 0.796*** 0.796***
(0.0848) (0.0847) (0.131) (0.130)
Never married -0.450*** -0.439*** -0.0355 -0.0193
(0.0344) (0.0341) (0.135) (0.131)
Unemployment rate -0.0725*** -0.0760*** -0.0776*** -0.0842***
(0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0226) (0.0221)
Constant 2.116 -0.258
(7.059) (6.577)
Observations 37,152 39,093 16,737 18,120
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.7: Regression results - three category split
Logistic regression Logistic regression with fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Had children during ”Moderate”
Right now 0.0398 0.0346 0.208 0.150
(0.101) (0.101) (0.165) (0.163)
1-5 years ago 0.0978* 0.00880 -0.0428 -0.141*
(0.0503) (0.0473) (0.260) (0.0852)
5+ years ago 0.226*** 0.107
(0.0456) (0.275)
Had children during ”Transition”
Right now -0.0424 -0.0196 -0.0743 0.00614 0.478*** 0.376*** 0.702** 0.627***
(0.0568) (0.0563) (0.116) (0.116) (0.104) (0.0982) (0.303) (0.206)
1-5 years ago -0.234*** -0.176*** -0.331*** -0.172*** 0.0988 -0.334*** 0.120 -0.323***
(0.0678) (0.0631) (0.0707) (0.0630) (0.173) (0.104) (0.175) (0.104)
5+ years ago -0.172** -0.254*** 0.637*** 0.672***
(0.0765) (0.0781) (0.204) (0.203)
Had children during ”Generous”
Right now 0.536*** 0.516*** 0.608*** 0.538*** 0.767*** 1.052*** 0.936*** 1.253***
(0.108) (0.107) (0.146) (0.145) (0.210) (0.188) (0.320) (0.260)
1-5 years ago -0.227 -0.218 -0.221 -0.216 -0.102 0.0692 -0.0948 0.0963
(0.144) (0.136) (0.144) (0.135) (0.258) (0.227) (0.257) (0.227)
5+ years ago -0.439** -0.454** -0.177 -0.215
(0.195) (0.195) (0.369) (0.368)
Children
1 -0.854*** -0.866*** -0.848*** -0.875*** -1.202*** -1.299*** -1.292*** -1.405***
(0.0812) (0.0812) (0.124) (0.124) (0.172) (0.170) (0.291) (0.236)
2+ -1.385*** -1.397*** -1.398*** -1.421*** -1.832*** -1.938*** -1.958*** -2.081***
(0.0687) (0.0687) (0.116) (0.116) (0.163) (0.160) (0.286) (0.227)
Age 0.0699*** 0.0670*** 0.0615*** 0.0630*** 0.266*** 0.280*** 0.253*** 0.268***
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0247) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0237)
Age squared -0.00136*** -0.00134*** -0.00128*** -0.00128*** -0.00445*** -0.00451*** -0.00433*** -0.00439***
(0.000134) (0.000133) (0.000132) (0.000131) (0.000295) (0.000294) (0.000286) (0.000285)
Education
High school (HS) 1.353*** 1.350*** 1.352*** 1.343*** 0.385** 0.406** 0.459** 0.482***
(0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0566) (0.0565) (0.188) (0.188) (0.183) (0.183)
Some college (SC) 1.892*** 1.894*** 1.914*** 1.908*** 0.737*** 0.793*** 0.791*** 0.850***
(0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0822) (0.0821) (0.251) (0.250) (0.246) (0.245)
Age of the youngest child 0.0468*** 0.0470*** 0.0472*** 0.0474*** 0.0387*** 0.0392*** 0.0391*** 0.0396***
(0.00420) (0.00420) (0.00413) (0.00412) (0.00731) (0.00731) (0.00717) (0.00714)
Children-Education Interaction
HS and 1 child -0.377*** -0.374*** -0.390*** -0.380*** -0.240 -0.261 -0.337* -0.358**
(0.0877) (0.0877) (0.0864) (0.0863) (0.183) (0.183) (0.179) (0.178)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.7 – continued from previous page
Logistic regression Logistic regression with fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HS and 2+ children -0.535*** -0.531*** -0.540*** -0.530*** -0.313* -0.334* -0.388** -0.410**
(0.0731) (0.0731) (0.0718) (0.0717) (0.176) (0.175) (0.171) (0.171)
SC and 1 child -0.453*** -0.456*** -0.490*** -0.496*** -0.0235 -0.0677 -0.0774 -0.123
(0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.243) (0.244) (0.238) (0.239)
SC and 2+ children -0.344*** -0.342*** -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.0939 -0.139 -0.124 -0.169
(0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.248) (0.247) (0.241) (0.241)
Calendar year -0.00661* -0.00897** -0.00963** -0.00791**
(0.00386) (0.00378) (0.00390) (0.00373)
Welfare dummy X Children
After the reform and no children 0.0962 -0.00404 0.135 -0.0111 -0.259 -0.173 -0.252 -0.168
(0.107) (0.101) (0.107) (0.101) (0.196) (0.183) (0.197) (0.182)
After the reform and 1 child 0.0287 0.0152 0.0401 0.00708 0.0423 0.0767 0.0538 0.0894
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116) (0.179) (0.178) (0.179) (0.178)
After the reform and 2 children 0.413*** 0.400*** 0.457*** 0.400*** 0.595*** 0.630*** 0.616*** 0.652***
(0.0966) (0.0959) (0.0971) (0.0960) (0.140) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140)
Never married -0.458*** -0.452*** -0.445*** -0.450*** -0.0487 -0.0429 -0.0382 -0.0312
(0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0341) (0.0340) (0.135) (0.135) (0.132) (0.132)
Unemployment rate -0.0612*** -0.0608*** -0.0587*** -0.0587*** -0.0751*** -0.0832*** -0.0804*** -0.0893***
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0220) (0.0219)
Constant 14.12* 18.88** 20.23*** 16.80**
(7.670) (7.508) (7.739) (7.409)
Observations 37,152 37,152 39,093 39,093 16,737 16,737 18,120 18,120
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.8: Regression results - four category split
Logistic regression Logistic regression with fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Had children during ”Moderate”
Right now 0.0396 0.0508 0.202 0.155
(0.101) (0.101) (0.165) (0.163)
1-5 years ago 0.116** 0.0949* -0.0500 -0.0263
(0.0510) (0.0505) (0.260) (0.121)
5-10 years ago 0.279*** 0.252*** 0.114 0.127
(0.0551) (0.0535) (0.277) (0.113)
10+ years ago 0.139** -0.0237
(0.0620) (0.295)
Had children during ”Transition”
Right now -0.0495 -0.0232 -0.0991 -0.0545 0.470*** 0.384*** 0.692** 0.527**
(0.0569) (0.0563) (0.117) (0.116) (0.105) (0.0985) (0.303) (0.222)
1-5 years ago -0.237*** -0.175*** -0.321*** -0.216*** 0.0906 -0.220* 0.127 -0.216*
(0.0678) (0.0647) (0.0711) (0.0654) (0.174) (0.118) (0.176) (0.118)
5-10 years ago -0.0835 0.0216 -0.151* 0.00517 0.659*** 0.264** 0.709*** 0.270**
(0.0886) (0.0820) (0.0916) (0.0822) (0.207) (0.129) (0.208) (0.129)
10+ years ago -0.297*** -0.336*** 0.565** 0.635***
(0.0969) (0.0984) (0.233) (0.231)
Had children during ”Generous”
Right now 0.527*** 0.508*** 0.604*** 0.584*** 0.761*** 0.945*** 0.963*** 1.094***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.146) (0.146) (0.210) (0.196) (0.321) (0.269)
1-5 years ago -0.205 -0.286** -0.185 -0.254* -0.0768 0.0854 -0.0532 0.132
(0.145) (0.140) (0.145) (0.140) (0.261) (0.247) (0.261) (0.247)
5-10 years ago -0.336 -0.466** -0.336 -0.445** -0.126 0.0801 -0.134 0.104
(0.209) (0.202) (0.210) (0.202) (0.390) (0.371) (0.390) (0.373)
10+ years ago -0.679 -0.688 -0.174 -0.273
(0.459) (0.460) (0.765) (0.755)
Children
1 -0.849*** -0.861*** -0.831*** -0.849*** -1.197*** -1.253*** -1.282*** -1.276***
(0.0812) (0.0812) (0.124) (0.124) (0.172) (0.171) (0.291) (0.245)
2+ -1.377*** -1.393*** -1.379*** -1.399*** -1.825*** -1.884*** -1.949*** -1.945***
(0.0687) (0.0687) (0.116) (0.116) (0.164) (0.162) (0.286) (0.237)
Age 0.0691*** 0.0672*** 0.0594*** 0.0577*** 0.267*** 0.278*** 0.250*** 0.262***
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0247) (0.0243) (0.0245) (0.0240)
Age squared -0.00135*** -0.00134*** -0.00125*** -0.00123*** -0.00445*** -0.00448*** -0.00427*** -0.00431***
(0.000134) (0.000134) (0.000132) (0.000132) (0.000295) (0.000294) (0.000290) (0.000288)
Education
High school (HS) 1.353*** 1.350*** 1.353*** 1.349*** 0.387** 0.404** 0.465** 0.484***
(0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0567) (0.0566) (0.188) (0.188) (0.184) (0.183)
Some college (SC) 1.890*** 1.892*** 1.913*** 1.915*** 0.737*** 0.775*** 0.788*** 0.829***
Continued on next page
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Table 2.8 – continued from previous page
Logistic regression Logistic regression with fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0822) (0.0822) (0.251) (0.250) (0.246) (0.245)
Age of the youngest child 0.0471*** 0.0468*** 0.0471*** 0.0467*** 0.0389*** 0.0397*** 0.0391*** 0.0402***
(0.00420) (0.00421) (0.00413) (0.00413) (0.00732) (0.00731) (0.00718) (0.00714)
Children-Education Interaction
HS and 1 child -0.377*** -0.374*** -0.392*** -0.389*** -0.243 -0.263 -0.344* -0.365**
(0.0877) (0.0877) (0.0864) (0.0864) (0.184) (0.183) (0.179) (0.178)
HS and 2+ children -0.536*** -0.531*** -0.543*** -0.539*** -0.317* -0.340* -0.395** -0.419**
(0.0731) (0.0731) (0.0719) (0.0718) (0.176) (0.175) (0.171) (0.171)
SC and 1 child -0.448*** -0.455*** -0.489*** -0.499*** -0.0245 -0.0561 -0.0791 -0.114
(0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.243) (0.243) (0.238) (0.238)
SC and 2+ children -0.341*** -0.342*** -0.369*** -0.373*** -0.0985 -0.138 -0.123 -0.166
(0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.248) (0.247) (0.241) (0.240)
Calendar year -0.00570 -0.00849** -0.00924** -0.0110***
(0.00388) (0.00379) (0.00393) (0.00381)
Welfare dummy X Children
After the reform and no children 0.0986 0.0548 0.175 0.149 -0.260 -0.202 -0.211 -0.151
(0.107) (0.105) (0.109) (0.107) (0.196) (0.192) (0.200) (0.196)
After the reform and 1 child 0.0357 0.00968 0.0650 0.0499 0.0481 0.0829 0.0849 0.124
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116) (0.179) (0.179) (0.180) (0.180)
After the reform and 2 children 0.409*** 0.394*** 0.465*** 0.446*** 0.592*** 0.610*** 0.637*** 0.655***
(0.0966) (0.0962) (0.0973) (0.0967) (0.140) (0.140) (0.142) (0.142)
Never married -0.459*** -0.454*** -0.445*** -0.444*** -0.0492 -0.0461 -0.0336 -0.0304
(0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.135) (0.135) (0.132) (0.132)
Unemployment rate -0.0602*** -0.0600*** -0.0593*** -0.0601*** -0.0750*** -0.0801*** -0.0817*** -0.0874***
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0221) (0.0220)
Constant 12.31 17.90** 19.48** 22.96***
(7.716) (7.527) (7.800) (7.557)
Observations 37,152 37,152 39,093 39,093 16,737 16,737 18,120 18,120
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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